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cuo•vuaL,;c of his claim or not and 
use of such or draft constitute an accord and satisfac-
it is immaterial that the creditor rn·.~tach 
the tender in full the law 
either 
condition. 
[2] !d.-Character of the 
satisfaction to apply in disposition of an 
there must be a bona fide dispute between the 
immaterial whether the has a solid foundation. 
[3] Id.-Tender-Acceptance.-For the of accord and 
satisfaction to apply, the debtor must make it clear that ac-
of what he tenders is to the condition that 
it be in full satisfaction. 
[4] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Findings on uonnJlCtJ.ng 
Evidence.-A finding of the trial court on evidence 
will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence of 
stantial character which reasonably the 
[5] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact--Findings on Evidence Sub-
ject to Different Inferences.-The conclusions trier of fact 
from evidence or testimony that is of 
conflicting or opposing inferences will not be set an 
appellate tribunal. 
[6] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Sufficiency of Evidence to 
Support Judgment.-The principles conclusive-
ness on appeal of findings upon <cv,cHL"'""l" 
of remittance 
or by indications debtor's 
regarded, 34 A.L.R. 1035; 75 A.L.R. 905. 
134; 1 Am.Jur. 228. 
McK. Dig. References: 
Accord and § 7; 
[4] Appeal and Error, 1280 
Appeal and § 1268 
Compromise and Settlement, 
§6; [12] and 
cannot successfully urge a contrary in-
evidenced by the fact that did 
not kno1v that defendants were disputing the amounts al-
shipments until they remitted 
correspondence and discussion 
between the culminated in an offer of 
which 
[9] Compromise and Settlement-Offer of Compromise.~An offer 
is not an admission that anything is due (Code 
it constitutes no proof of liability, and its 
without cannot affect the 
[10] Accord and Satisfaction-Payment in Full Satisfaction.-In 
an action to recover the alleged balance due on the sale of 
the defense of accord and satisfaction is 
significance that the portions of the 
constituted the point of differ-
Wf~re computed as separable items for 
deduction on thr vouchr;rs accompanying defendants' remit~ 
testimony of a defendant indi-
was integrated into tho entire con-
~Yhere one involved other disputed and deducted 
and where the record clearly shows that in eaeh instance 
demand was in dispute and the respective 
were intended and accepted in full diseharge of the 
G94 PoTTER v. PAciFic CoAsT lJUMBER Co. [37 C.2d 
Id.~Effect of Payment of Conceded Part of Disputed Claim.-
The fact that a conditionally tendered remittance is in the 
eonceded sum of a disputed indebtedness will not prevent an 
aecord and satisfaction from arising, whPre the tender is 
applicable to the entire demand. 
[12] Compromise and Settlement-Policy of Law.--'rhe law wisely 
favors settlements, and where there is a real and genuine 
contest between the parties, and a settlement is had without 
fraud or misrepresentation, for an amount determined as a 
compromise between the conflicting claims, such settlement 
will be upheld, although the amount paid is materially less than 
the amount claimed by the party to whom it is paid. 
APPEAl; from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Luis Obispo County. Hay B. lJyon, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action to recover balance due under contracts for sale of 
lnmber. .Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions. 
Buck & O'Heilly and ,John I<'. Runner for Appellants. 
Renetzky & Davis, Paul W. Davis and Laura 0. Coffield for 
Respondent. 
SPENCE, ,J.--Plaintiff sought to recover the alleged balance 
due under contraets for the sale of three carloads of lumber. 
Defendants pleaded an accord and satisfaction as an affirm-
ative defense. The trial eonrt made findings rejeeting said 
defense and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the 
sum of $1,011.96. Prom such judgment, defendants appeal. 
Defendants argue the single proposition that the findings 
against the existenee of an aeeord and satisfaetion are eon-
trary to the undit;puted facts. An t'Xamination of the re<:ord 
sm:tains dPfPndants' position. 
Plaintiff, a lumber broker in Oregon, eontraeted to sell thre<~ 
<·arloarls of Oregon lnmber to defendant eompany, a Cali-
fornia eorporation with offiees in San Luis Obispo. Defend-
ants C. V. Wilson and S. G. Truitt, as viee-president and 
purehasing agent, respeetively, of defendant company, nego-
tiated the eontraets. The terms of sale speeified grade, 
widths, and surfaeing of the lumber and a stated priee per 
[11] Payment of undisputed amount or liability as consideration 
for discharge of disputed amount or liability, note, 112 A.L.R. 1219. 
See, also 1 Cal.Jur. 131; 1 Am.Jur. 251. 
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1,000 board feet "F.O.B. mill," with 2 per cent discount 
for cash. At the trial defendants claimed that under busi-
ness custom with respect to such sales of Oregon lumber 
"F.O.B. mill," the freight eharge would be at the "Portland 
rate "-that the buyer would be obligatt'd to pay the 
shipping eo»t as t~omputed from Portland to the point of 
destinatioH---unles;,; a different zone or rate was speeified; 
that such uniform practice prevails so that the buyer may 
know what his "laid down eost is" for lumber as supplied 
from various small mills loeated in different parts of the 
state, and any freight eost that the seller ''may have to get 
the lumber into the [applicable] zone is reflected iu the mill 
price''; and that on sueh basis, the buyer would regularly 
charge back to the seller any "excess freight" paid to the 
carrier. Plaintiff denied having any knowledge of such ap-
plicable "zone system" and the existence of such business 
custom. In none of the three contracts in question was there 
anything said concerning freight or the shipping rate eharge-
able exeept the bare term "F.O.B. mill.'· 
The first order ealled for shipment from Oregon to San 
Luis Obispo. '!'hat carload arrived with a freight bill from 
Spokane, \Vashingtou, to San IJt1is Obispo, as the result 
of an erroneous routing. Defendant company paid the ear-
rier's freight bilL lt then remitted $2,930.14 by check to 
plaintiff, this sum representing the amount of plaintiff's 
invoice, less the 2 per cent cash discount and $86.40 as "freight 
overcharge' '-being the cliff(~rence between the freight actu-
ally paid to the carrier and the freight from Portland, 
Oregon. 
The other two orders called for shipment, respectively, 
to Grover City, California, and Santa Barbara. The lumber 
in each of these carloads was rough-milled at St"neca, in 
eastern Oregon; one earload was then shipped to Brewster, 
Oregon, for "re-manufacture," and from there transported 
to Grover City, while the other carload was shipped tv 
Portland for ''re-manufacture,'' and thence to Santa Bar-
bara. On these two shipments defendant company remitted 
to plaintiff by cheek the respeetive amounts of $2,594.76 
and $1,772.89, having deducted in eaeh instance the 2 per 
eent cash diseonnt and the freight rate chargeable from eastern 
to western Oregon, respectively $500.35 and $361.49. In 
addition, with respeet to the Santa Barbara ear, these further 
deductions were made : $35.71 for ''scant loading,'' an extra 
eharge exacted by the carrier because the car had not been 
of account stated below, and endorsement therPof 
stitnte payee's receipt to the Pacific Coast I_lumbcr 
sett l em e11 t 
of California." Plaintiff eashed eaeh three 
tam~e ehccks or ,Jrafts, and then later 
eompany seeking additional 
The trial eourt found that defendants 
in the snm of $1,0JJ .9G de-
to the San Luis dc-
•luction of for the '' , with 
'''"n"u,,_ to the Santa Barbara car the deductions for ''scant 
" improper surfacing and "random widths' . 'With 
to defendants' special of an and satis-
LU'~""Ju, the eourt found that the 
that the checks were actually sent to 
were untrue, that it true 
the voucher attached to each check com-
pany "informed plaintiff that it intended the ehcck as full 
of a certain disputed '' or that the vouchers 
''informed plaintiff that the said checks intended as 
full " or that "plaintiff, the 
ment depositing for collection of said or in 
any other manner, agreed to any settlement of the amount 
due plaintiff." Defendants properly contest the propriety 
597 
Or uuuy_UHAat,CU 
settlement thereof is 
the creditor that must be 
of his claim'' or not at the 
the condition" on 
5220: see, also, 1 CaL Jur. § 
1044 75 A.IJ.R. 905, 916; 
166 Cal. 25, 27 P. 989] ; 
447 [213 P. 45]; Sierra&; San 
Co. Y. Universa~ Electric &; Gas 197 Cal. 
P. Johnston v. Burnett, 17 497, 
Rttssell &; Peterson, 82 Cal.App. 
P. ; Robertson v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 
P.2d 175] ). [2] Of course, for the 
accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition 
there must be a "bona fide 
between the Y. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 218 
P.2d ) , but ''it matters not that there was no solid foun-
dation for the '' as the test is whether ''the dispute 
vms honest or fraudulent" (B.&; tV. Engineering Co. v. Beam, 
23 171 [137 P. 624]; see 1 C.J.S. § 32(b), 
1 CaLJur. § 7, p. 131; Berger v. Lane, st~pra, 
450-451; Shortell v. Evans-Fergttson Corp., 98 
663 [277 P. 519]; Everhardy v. Union Ft'nance 
465 [1 P.2d 1024] ). [3] Also, the 
make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders 
to the condition that it shall be in full satisfaction. 
223 Ann.Cas. 1915A, 954 Lapp-Gifford 
supra, 166 Cal. 25, 27-28; Biaggz: 
105, 113-114 [170 P.2d 678] 
of these settled rules to the n"''""''+ 
that ''A of the 
evidence will not be disturbed on 
of a substantial character which 
the judgment." (Fewel &; Dawes, Inc. 
89 P.2d [5] 
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it must be said that the conclusions of a trier of fact from 
evidence or testimony that is reasonably susceptible of con-
flicting or opposing inferences will not be set aside by an 
appellate tribunaL (Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 
143 P.2d 689] .) [6] But these principles do not relieve 
an appellate court of its duty of analyzing the record for the 
purpose of determining whether or not there is any evidence 
of substantial character which reasonably supports the judg-
ment as applied to the peculiar facts of the case. (See 
1 C.J.S. § 49 (b), pp. 565-567.) [7] Upon such review, the 
conclusion is inescapable that the record here does not justify 
the finding that no accord and satisfaction was effected by the 
parties in settlement of plaintiff's claim, and that the trial 
com::t erred, as a matter of law, in adjudicating this issue con-
trary to defendants' position. (2 Cal.Jur. § 542, p. 918.) 
Here the check or draft in each instance remitted to plain-
tiff in payment for the respective carloads of lumber had 
attached a voucher with a printed statement thereon declaring, 
in clrar and unequivocal terms, that the tender was made "in 
full settlement of account stated below" and calling for ac-
ceptance upon that precise condition. Plaintiff clearly under-
stood, according to his own admissions at the trial, that de-
fendant company intended such remittances to constitute pay-
mE>nt in full of the particular claim as plainly identified on 
the voucher. Thus, plaintiff, in response to the question of 
whether he had talked to defendant Wilson before cashing 
the draft tendered in payment for the first shipment, stated: 
''Yes, I think I did; and then I felt, if they were going to be 
that way about it, the best thing for me to do was to cash 
the draft so they couldn't stop payment on the draft. This 
was not a check, it was a draft. I knew that, with a dispute 
of that type, that there would be a question as to my accepting 
that as final payment, but I figured that a bird in the hand 
was better than nothing.'' Plaintiff further testified that ''at 
the time r he] cashed [the J checks, [he] knew there was a 
dispute as to the amounts"; that he checked "the deductions" 
that were taken, knew the "freight" amounts to be "so much" 
and had ''notice'' of the other items as shown ''from the at-
tached statement [ s].'' From this testimony it plainly appears 
that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties, not only 
as to the assessable freight charges, but also as to the other 
matters listed by defendant company as deductible items upon 
tender of the checks or drafts in full settlement, and that plain-
tiff so nndf'rstood the explicit terms of the proffered settle-
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ment. ln such circumstanees, plaintiff's acceptance, endorse-
ment, and cashing of the checks or drafts amounted in legal 
effect to an agreement that the claims be thereby compromised 
and settled (Russell v. Riley & Peterson, supra, 82 CaLApp. 
728, 737-7:18) ; he "could not accept the benefits of the checks 
cashing them, vrithout consenting to the conditions en-
dorsed thereon" ( Robert:wn v. Robertson, snpm, 34 Cal.App. 
2d 113, 118) ; and such uncommunicated mental reservations 
as plaintiff may have had that he and defendants "would be 
able to settle it [the dispute] one way or the other later" 
could not militate against the validity of the accord and satis-
faction (Cre·ighton v. Gregory, 142 CaL 34, 41 [75 P. 569]). 
So pertinent is the statement in Johnston v. Burnett, supra, 
17 CaLA.pp. 497, at page 501: ''He [plaintiff] was bound either 
to reject the cheek, or, by aeeepting it, accede to the defend-
ant's terms .... He could not accept the benefit, and reject 
the condition .... The use of the cheek was ipso facto an 
aeeeptance of the condition. 'rhe minds of the parties then 
met, so as to eonstitute an accord." 
[8a] Plaintiff argues that "the eonduct of both parties 
after the receipt and cashing of the drafts'' indicates that 
''neither of them intended that the prior acceptance by 
[plaintiff] of the drafts was in full settlement of his claim [s].'' 
rro this point he cites these evidentiary considerations: that 
until he received the respective drafts, he did not know that 
defendants were disputing the amounts allegedly due on the 
respeetive shipments; that after receiving the first of the three 
drafts but before eashing it, he spoke to defendant Wilson 
by telephone and protested the deductions taken; that after 
eashing the three drafts, he went to defendant company's 
Seattle office and discussed the factors in dispute; that there 
then followed an exchange of correspondence between him and 
defendant ·wilson as to the propriety of the deductions; and 
finally, the whole subject was discussed at a meeting in Santa 
Barbara between himself and defendant \Vilson, eulminating 
in the latter's offer of a settlement but that he would not agree 
to it. However, these matters do not strengthen plaintiff's 
position. Reasonably viewed, they simply show that plaintiff 
did not willingly assent to the condition of "full settlement" 
accompanying the three remittances; that after cashing the 
three drafts tendered for acceptance on the prescribed express 
terms. he nevertheless persisted in his efforts to collect addi-
tional amounts which he claimed to be still due under the 
original contraets of sale; and that defendants remained firm 
of the accounts, or from the 
tiff's cashing such cheeks and drafts upon that basis in estab~ 
lishment of an accord and satisfaction. 
supra, 17 Cal.1\pp. 497, 501.) 
Plaintiff unavailingly cites cases where cor~ 
respondence failed to state that the remittance was ''intended 
or offered as in full of all demands" Co. v. 
Muscoy Water Co., supra, 166 Cal. 
continued uncertainty as to the extent of their differences 
called for further checking on the matter of an 
conduct showing that ' did not consider the 
[prior] cheek a final settlement of the debt" (Work v. Asso-
ciated Almond Growers, 102 Cal.App. 236 P. ) ; 
where evidence of "constructive fraud, or at least " 
operated to impeach the '' eonelusiveness of the asserted stated 
account" despite the notation of the words "full ' on 
the cheek (Kinkle v. Fruit Growet·s 63 Cal.App. 
2d 102, 115 [146 P.2d 8]) ; where the debtor "at the time the 
check ''ms tendered . . . himself conceded that it did not rep-
resent the full amount due" and not there a failure 
an ''accord and '' but it was A~~"'w~' 
'' that there never had been an '' 
Noble, 77 Cal.App.2d 209, 215 P.2d ). Under such 
distinguishable circumstances, it is not open to that 
the trial court's finding· that no accord and satisfaction had 
been effected by the parties was substantial evi-
dence. But that is not the record in this case. Here the con-
dition imposed upon plaintiff's acceptance of the checks or 
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account'' 
114) there was no 




still open for 
true that 
evidence or where infer~ 
drawn from uncontradicted whether ''a 
the amount due and whether the tender 
was on eondition that acceptance would be in full satisfaetion 
questions of fact for the trial court'' (Owens 
supra, 77 Cal.App.2d 209, 215) and "unless there 
evir1ence to support the finding of the jury or 
of the court in that regard, determina-
tion of that issue existence of an accord and satisfaetion] 
.. will not he disturheo on appeal" (Moore v. 92 CalApp. 
2d 812 [207 P.2d 835] ; also D. E. Sanford Co. v. Cory 
Brewer Co., 85 Ca1.App.2d 724, 730 [194 P.2d 
1271), jm;t sueh lack of evidence prevails here. The rec-
ord eonelusiYely shows from plaintiff's own testimony that he 
knowingly aecepted the remittances from defendants on the 
terms definitely stated on the accompanying vouchers in un~ 
equivocal expression of their intent as ''full settlemrnt,'' for 
he "fig·ured that a bird in the hand was better than nothing." 
This state of the evidence cannot be reasonably held to give 
rise to conflieting inferences as to the intention of the parties 
to consummate an accord and satisfaction upon the tender and 
acceptance of the checks or drafts in question, but rather they 
irresistibly point to the conclusion that plaintiff is estopped 
to deny the effrct of his deliberate act in full settlement of the 
disputed accounts between the parties. (See Creighton v. 
Grcuory, snpra, 142 Cal. 34, 41-42.) 
[10] ?\or is it of legal significance that the charges 
m'r<~ eompnte(1 Hs separable items for deduction and eonsti~ 
tnte<l H major point of diffrrence between the parties. While 
the freight items were listed as definite amounts on each of 
the vouehers accompanying the remittances, the total freight 
a part of which was disputed) was for all practical 
purposes integrated into the entire contract to which it re-
lated. To this point is defendant Wilson's undisputed testi-
mony that defendant company, as the buyer of goods f.o.b. 
point of manufacture, must have "the mill price and the 
freight ratc"~~the "delivered price"-at hand so as to "know 
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what laid down cost is.'' In such circumstances it would 
be unrealistic to isolate the freight items and regard such 
items as severable undertakings in the consummation of the 
parties' dealings. Moreover, in the case of one disputed ship-
ment-the Santa Barbara car-there were also included, as 
dedurtible items. amounts for "seant loading," improper sur~ 
faeing. and '' ranrlom '' RO that it cannot reaRonably 
he Raid that thr partieR eonsidrred, at the time of the tender 
and aerrptanrP of thf' eheckR or that the only matters 
in eontroversy wen' the freight chargeR. Rather, as defend-
ants maintain. thr rreord elrarly shows that in each instance 
plaintiff's entire (lemand was in dispnte and the respeetive 
ehreks wrre intended and a(•ceptrd in full diRc•.harge of the 
entirr disputed obligation. 
[11] It iR further suggested that drfrndant company, by 
the rPRpectivr remittances in the rednced sums, paid only 
the conceded ammmt of indebtedneRs on eaeh shipment. But 
that ciremns1ance would not prevent an aceord and Ratisfac-
tion ariRing- from aeceptanre of thP conditionally offered re-
mittances applicable to the entire demand. While there is 
some conflict in the authorities on whether the payment of the 
conceded part- of the claim is a good accord and satisfaction 
if received in diseharge of the whole ( anno. 112 A.L.R. 1219), 
it is the majority view, as well as the "tendency of the later 
easeR," to "sustain the discharge where there is a dispute aR 
to any part of the elaim madP by the creditor. although thP 
payment is only the sma11Pr amount which was conceded by 
the debtor to be due." (1 Am .• Tur. § 64, p. 251; also Williston 
on Contracts, rev. ed., vol. I, § 129, p. 439, and cases there 
cited.) Consistent with this "tendency" in the rationale of 
"the later cases" is the derision in Robertson v. Robertson. 
supra. 84 Cal.App.2d 118, whPrP concf'dedly dne payments of 
snpport mone;\' were made by check" marked ~'in full pay~ 
ment to r date l" and the only fliRpnte between the part.iPS 
inYolYe(l the qnrr;tion of wh<'thrr a greater ammmt waR due 
pursuant to the tPrms of a property sPttlement agreement. Tn 
sm;taining tlw defense of an aceord and satisfaction, the court 
aptly stated at page 118: "The consideration for the tE'nder 
and aeeeptance of each check in a less amount was the deter-
mination of dispute, and the extinction of obligation in rela-
tion to Pach monthly payment so made." 
[12] "The law wisely favors settlements, and where there is a 
real :mel gennine rontE'st betwE'E'n the parties, and a settlement 
is had without fraud or misrepresentation, for an amount 
POTTER v. J-"'Af1T1Ci)T£' 603 
[37 
determined upon as a between the conflicting 
claims, such settlement should be although such amount 
is materially less than the amount by the person to 
whom it is paid." v. TJwmas, 212 N.Y. 264 [106 N.E. 
net:tH1lL B. & lV. Engi;neering Oo. v. Beam, supra, 
It is to see how defend-
"'""t'u"·'" in stating to plain-
the conditional tender of the or drafts in question, 
and we therefore conclude that the latter's acceptance and 
""'""',lj'l': of and pursuant to their unequi-
vocal terms of "full settlement" constituted, as a matter of 
Jaw, an accord and satisfaction. 
The judgment is reversed, with directions to the trial court 
to make findings of fact· and conclusions law and to enter 
judgment thereon iu of defendants in with 
the 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I disseut. 
and Schaner, J ., 
While the factual situation disclosed by the record may have 
presented a. problem of solution by the trier of fact, 
I cannot say that there was not sufficient evidence to support 
the findiug that defendant corporation was indebteded to the 
plaintiff in the amount found, and for which judgment was 
rendered. This was affirmed by the District Court 
of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, and I 
adopt, as my dissent, the opinion of that court prepared by 
1\fr, Presiding J ustiee White, which is as follows: 
''Defendants appeal from a judgment in :favor of plaintiff, 
a lumber broker, in an action fO'r a balance claimed to be due 
under contracts :for the sale of three carloads of lumber to 
the de:feudant corporation, Pacific Coast Lumber Company. 
Defendants C. V. Wilson and S. G. Truitt, as vice-president 
and purchasing respectively, of defendant corporatiou, 
negotiated the contracts. The complaint was in thf;l form of 
common counts. The answer, in addition to denials, set forth 
an affirmative defense of a'Ccord and satisfaction, the sub-
stance of the allegations in this respect being that three cheeks 
in stated amounts had been mailed to plaintiff by defendant 
corporation; that attached to each of said cheeks was a voucher 
in which said defendant informed plaintiff that it intended 
the check as full payment of a certain disputed claim; that 
PoTTER 
so attached to the three 
that the intended as full no,rrrlOYI 
tiff indorsed and cashed each and 
the settlement intended by the defendant 
uutn.tug said the defendants in 
transaction involved a carload 
surfacing, and per 
' with 2 per cent discount for 
lumber \Yas to be shipped from Oregon to San Luis 
arrival of the shipment, defendant corporation 
freight bill ·which covered freight from 
to San Luis Obispo. The corporation then re-
mitted $2,930.14 by check to the plaintiff, this sum repre-
senting the amount of the plaintiff's invoice less the cash 
discount and less $86.40 claimed as 'freight '-
the difference between the freight actually paid the 
carrier and the freight from Portland, Oregon. 
''Subsequently defendant corporation ordered two more 
carloads of pine, one to be shipped to Grover City, California, 
and the other to Santa Barbara. Again, it was understood 
that the lumber was to come from Oregon, although the plain-
tiff testified that he informed defendants it would come from 
eastern Oregon. The lumber in these two carloads was rough-
milled at Seneca, in eastern Oregon. One carload was then 
shipped to Brewster, Oregon, for 're-manufacture,' and from 
there transported to Grover City, while the other carload was 
shipped to Portland for 're-manufacture' and thence to Santa 
Barbara. On each of these shipments defendant corporation 
remitted to the plaintiff by check, deducting the 2 per cent 
cash discount and also deducting the items representing 
freight charges from eastern to western Oregon. In the case 
of the Santa Barbara car defendant also made certain deduc-
tions for 'scant loading,' 'improper surfacing,' and 'random 
widths.' 
"Defendant C. V. Wilson testified that by F.O.B. mill' 
he understood to mean F.O.B. the 're-manufacturing' mill 
where the lumber was finished and from whence it was finally 
shipped; he and other witnesses also testified to a custom of 
the lumber trade that where Oregon lumber is sold 'F.O.B. 
mill' a zone freight rate is often specified, but if nothing is 
said about the zone, then the 'Portland rate,' from Portland, 
Oregon, to destination, will apply; in such case the custom 
is for the purchaser to charge back to the seller any excess 
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In none of the transactions here 
said or the 
rate the bare 'F.O.B. mill.' 
Plaintiff denied the existence of any such custom. 
for each of the three defendant 
each such voucher was the notation : 
attached 
for which 
amount of the 
Printed at the 
will please detach and keep this statement. 
ment of draft attached hereto is accepted in full settle-
ment of account stated below, and endorsement thereof will 
~~onstitute payee's receipt to the Pacific Coast Immber Com-
pany of California.' 
''The trial court found that defendants were indebted to 
in the sum of $1,011.96; and with respect to the 
special defense found that the allegations thereof (except, of 
course, that the checks were actually sent) were untrue, thereby 
finding that it was not true that by the voucher attached to 
0ach check defendant corporation 'informed plaintiff that it 
intended the check as full payment of a certain disputed 
daim,' or that the vouchers 'informed plaintiff that the said 
checks were intended as full payment.' The court further 
found that 'it is not true that plaintiff, by the acceptance, 
endorsement and/or depositing for collection of said drafts, 
or in any other manner, agreed to any settlement of the amount 
rlne plaintiff.' 
"Appellants contend that the trial court's findings relating 
to the alleged accord and satisfaction were contrary to undis-
puted facts in evidence. With respect to the finding (implied) 
that plaintiff was not informed that the checks he received 
were intenderl by defendant corporation as payment in full. 
attention iR dir(wted to testimony of the plaintiff. aR follows: 
" 'Q. Dirl you talk to him (Mr. Wilson) before yon cashed 
it. Did yon eall him up before you cashed it 1 (Referring 
to the payment on the first shipment.) A. Yes, I think I did; 
and then I felt, if they were going to be that way about it, 
the best thing for me to do was to cash the draft RO they 
(•ouldn 't stop payment on the draft. This was not a check. 
it was a drafi. I knew that, with a dispute of that type, that 
there would be a fJuestion as to my accE'pting that as final 
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payment, but I figured that a bird in the hand was better 
than nothing. 
" 'Q. \V ell, Mr. Potter, at the time you eashed those checks, 
you knew there was a dispute as to the amounts? A. Yes, 
because the amount was short on the draft. I :figured we >vould 
be able to settle it one way or the other later. 
" 'Q. Did you know the basis for the dispute A. No, only 
from cheeking the dedmtions that I :figured that they took. 
I knew that the freight amounted to so much. Q. Then you 
surmised, at least, that the deduction on one item was for 
freight? A. That's right. Q. And on the other item, yon 
had notice of what the decluctions were from the attached 
statement with the ch0ck, did you noU A. Yes, sir.' 
"Appellants argue that 'on thE' basis of the foregoing testi-
mony the ultimate fact irresistibly following is that the defend-
ant corporation informed the plaintiff ... that the check or 
draft tendered therewith was offered in full payment of a 
ecrtain fully idrnti:fi0d. (1ispntrd claim.' Appellants' remain-
ing two contentions with respect to the findings are that there 
is no support in the evidence for the finding that by his ac-
ceptance of the checks or drafts plaintiff did not agree to 
a settlement, or for the finding that there was no bona :fide 
dispute eonrerning the amount due. 
''As conceded by appellants, 'A :finding of the trial court 
upon conflicting evidenre will not be disturbed on appeal if 
there is evidence of a substantial character which reasonably 
supports tl1e judgment.' (F'ewel ([; Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt. 17 
Ca1.2d 85, 88 [108 P.2d 650].) It is also well settled that the 
conelnsions of a trier of fact from evidence or testimony that 
is susceptible of conflicting or opposing inferences will not be 
set aside by an appellate tribunal. ( n'state of Br~:stol, 2::1 Cal. 
2d 221 [14::1 P.2d 689] .) 
"Conreding the foree of appellants' argument that the evi-
drlH'r cl(•arly shows the existencP of a dispute as to the amount 
(111(', and fnrtl1er that plaintiff was informed, by the fact that 
thP eheeks WNe for less than the amount of his invoice, by 
the notations appearing on the attached vouchers, and through 
telephone conversations with defendants, that defendant cor-
poration contested the particular freight items in question-
it does not follow that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, 
in concluding that no accord and satisfaction was consum-
mated. 
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"It was an essential clement of defendants' proof of an 
accord and satisfaction that their tender of a check for less 
than the amount due be expressly conditioned that if the money 
be accepted, it is to be iu full satisfaction. (1 Am.Jur. 222, 
223.) As said in the cited authority, at page 223 : 
'· 'As pointed out in the preceding section, in order that 
the aeceptanee of an offer of payment of a lesser sum in dis-
eharge of a greater shall result in the discharge, it is a neces-
sary element that the offer be made upon condition that the 
creditor accept the offered sum in full satisfaction of the in-
debtedness. 'rhis principle finds frequent application in the 
case of checks and other remittances. In order that the ac-
ceptance of the check or remittance shall operate as a full dis-
charge, the eondition that it is to be accepted in full satis-
faction of the pending claim or obligation must be expressly 
made or the circumstances must be such as to indicate clearly 
to the creditor that it is so sent. 
" 'When the assent of the creditor is sought to be inferred 
from the acceptance of a less sum than that claimed to be due, 
the fact that such amount is offered in full discharge of the 
whole claim must have been communicated to the creditor 
in some unmistakable manner. Consequently, where a check 
is tendered, even though it accompanies an account, if there 
is no expression of the condition that it must be accepted in 
full payment, the acceptance of the check does not constitute 
an accord and satisfaction, as no agreement to that effect can 
be implied from the transaction .... ' 
''Under the particular facts of the case at bar, it would 
appear that the trier of faet was justified in concluding, de-
spite the printed statement on the voucher, that the tender 
of eaeh check or draft was not unequivocally stated to be on 
condition that it be accepted in full settlement. The language 
of Owens v. Noble, 77 Cal.App.2d 209, 215 f175 P.2d 241], 
quoting from Biaggi v. Sawyer, 75 Cal.App.2d 105, 114 [170 
P.2d 6781, is here pertinent: ' "Whether there was a dispute 
concerning the amount due and whether the tender was on 
condition that acceptance would be in full satisfaction, are 
primarily questions of fact for the trial court.'' In the case 
of W at·k v. Associated Almond Growers, 102 Cal.App. 232, 
2:36 [282 P. 9651, this court quoted from cited authorities as 
follows : "It is an essential element of accord and satisfaction 
by tender of a cheek, that the tender is subject to the condition 
that the acceptance of the check is satisfaction in full. This 
condition is uot shown by the mere fact that the debtor ac-
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''The record does not disclose conclusive evidence that 
was advised that his of the 
drafts in any of the three transactions would be 
eonsidered as an agreement to an accord and satisfaction. 
On the contrary, the actions of the parties indicate 
that the defendant corporation asserted that it was not liable 
for eertaiu freight charges and refused to pay them. It is 
significant in this respect that the disputed freight 
>Yas a separable item. The amount tendered by defendant cor-
poration was an amount admittedly due. The trier of fact 
eonld ·well conclude that the amount tendered was not offered 
in settlement of a disputed claim, but, as above stated, in pay-
ment of a conceded indebtedness, leaving at large the question 
of from whieh point freight should be charged to the buyer. 
Upon analysis, the facts herein show that an acknowledged 
debtor has made a remittance of an amount admittedly clue, 
and now seeks to have declared an accord and satisfaction 
beeause the ereditor accepted what was concededly justly due 
him. rl'he trier of fact was \Varranted in concluding that there 
was Jacking an essential element of an accord and satisfaction, 
to wit, that the payment was offered and accepted in settlement 
of a disputed demand. Here no payment whatever was made 
on the 'disputed' demand. 
"The situation here presented is one in which an aclmowl-
edged debtor, disputing one small separable item of an in-
voice received in the regular course of business, deducts from 
his remittance the amount he disputes and remits in the regu-
lar eourse of business an amount admittedly accom-
panying his check with a voucher in enstomary form contain-
ing printed ~words to the effect that the remittance is accepted 
'in full settlement of account stated below.' It cannot be 
held that as a matter of law in such circumstances there has 
been an aceorcl and satisfaction or account stated. 
'' '. . . to hold otherwise would put in the power of a 
sharp, shre>vd business man frequently to take advantage of 
ecmsiileration. 
''The 
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is affirmed. '' 
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[1] Judgments- Declaratory Relief- Discretion of Court.-The 
discretion ex1~rcisable the court pur~uant to Code Civ. Proc., 
~ 1061, refusal of relief when not neces~ 
sary or proper, is a or judicial discretion to ap-
aud su<'h rP!ief must he when facts 
[2] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Refusal of Relief.-Itefusal, pur-
suant to Code Civ. Proc., §lOtH, of relief author-
ized by § 1060, is limited to cases where a dPclaration of rights 
and ohligations would be unm'cPssary or at the time 
under all the circumstances. 
[3] Id.- Declaratory Judgments- Purpose. Code Civ. Proc., 
§§lOGO et seq., provide deelaratory relief so that may 
know their rights and vvhere 
before a breach or violation occurs. 
f4a, 4b] !d.-Declaratory Judgments-Dismissal of 
It is error to dismiss 
accounting on the 
fordt>d a money in an aetion for au 
where a cause of action for an stated. 
See i) Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (19+1 
McK. Dig. References: 2, 4] Judgments, 
§9(1a); [5] .Judgments, 9. 
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